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Abstract 
Historical experience shows that in the world of high capital mobility, sudden stops of capital inflows may 
occur, typically triggering financial crises. The latest financial crisis in the Euro zone (EZ) seems to support this 
point of view. Euro adoption encouraged a capital flow bonanza  from the countries which constitute the center 
of the Eurozone, to the countries which make up the periphery of the Eurozone, where it was possible to obtain 
better returns, due to their less developed financial systems. This explains the large current account surplus in 
the Euro centre countries (like Germany and Netherlands) and the deficits in the Euro periphery countries 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain). The sudden stop which happened in 2009, made it difficult for periphery countries to 
roll over debt, and thus caused a crisis. This paper analyses the role of large capital inflows in generating the EZ 
crisis. We argues that the impact on capital flows within the Eurozone of financial deregulation and 
liberalization and of the adoption of the common currency was critical in exacerbating a growing 
competitiveness gap between core and periphery countries and explaining the evolution of the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Capital flows represent a significant factor for rapid development of emerging markets. Also they can feed the 
boom and bust cycles, when money enter and exit countries with high speed. Indeed, on one hand capital 
inflows increase economic growth in emerging markets, on the other hand they cause growth of asset prices, 
credit expansion and growth of inflation rate. Capital flow “bonanzas” significantly raise the risk of financial 
crises, since such episodes systematically precede sovereign debt crises, for once the capital flow stops, the 
country on the receiving end is suddenly unable to roll over the debt it has accumulated [1]. Financial crises in 
the past two decades significantly changed the attitude of academic economists about financial globalization. 
Those crisis, beginning from the Mexican one, are so called   “capital account crises”, and they are all 
characterized by unsustainable deficit of current account, financed on various modes [2]. 
The major feature of recent global crisis was the great volatility of capital flows. The reasons for great capital 
inflows in emerging market economies, starting from the beginning of this century, are due to the potentials for 
higher growth of these economies and higher expected returns of the invested capital. Simultaneously, the 
inflows were motivated by the financial stability, which in that period was typical for those countries [3]. This 
caused a large capital flow from Europe’s core to periphery, much like NAFTA helped to spark a surge in 
capital from US to Mexico in early 1990s. And the periphery countries, in turn, were able to benefit from 
tremendous influx of capital that reduced borrowing costs. Investors in the core were happy about the relatively 
high returns they were getting in the periphery and the periphery countries enjoyed an economic boom [4]. It is 
necessary to notice that big capital inflow before the crisis of 2007, were not unprecedented. 
This is not the first time we’ve seen a dramatic influx of capital when countries break down economic and 
financial barriers. The same thing happened in Mexico following the creation of NAFTA in the early 1990s, and 
East Asia in the mid-to-late 1990s. Private capital inflows were of same size, if not even bigger in the last 
century 90s [5]. 
When less developed countries become more integrated with the rest of the world, investors typically try to take 
advantage by sending lots of capital their way. The problem is that such surges in capital flows depend on the 
whims of international investors, and therefore have a notorious tendency to come to a sudden stop if investor 
sentiment changes. And when that happens, severe financial crisis often follows [6]. 
2. The impact of capital flows on the recent Euro zone crisis  
Deeper analysis of the dynamics underlying the current Eurozone crisis shows that financial deregulation and 
liberalization was a major cause of the crisis in periphery countries in the Eurozone. Financial deregulation and 
liberalization encouraged the development of new financial instruments and derivatives and allowed banks in 
core Eurozone countries to increase leverage and boost loanable funds, spurring a real estate and consumption 
boom. This boom was also made possible by the adoption of the Euro in the context of greater European 
financial and economic integration, which lowered the currency risk in periphery countries and permitted 
interest rates to converge towards a much lower level in core countries. The interest rates in the Eurozone’s core 
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and periphery rapidly converged, and by 2004 there was no difference in interest rates of the periphery countries 
and that of Germany. Europe’s common currency area caused the Eurozone periphery to incur large amounts of 
international debt. One of the principal goals of Europe’s common currency has always been to promote greater 
financial market integration among member countries. It was expected that the common currency would make it 
easier for investors of certain Euro countries to find good investment opportunities in other Euro countries since 
they would no longer have to worry about fickle exchange rates. One of the perceived benefits of the Euro was 
to make it easier for capital to flow from countries with abundant capital, and thus relatively low returns to 
investments, to countries that were relatively capital-poor, and that therefore offered high returns on 
investments. In the case of Europe, the capital-rich countries were at the core of the Eurozone. The adoption of 
the Euro by periphery countries in 1999 allowed lenders in the Eurozone’s core to take advantage of relatively 
high rates of return in the periphery [4]. These capital flows fueled a peripheral boom, and sharply rising wages 
and prices in the Eurozone’s periphery relative to Euro zone core. The importance of the Euro can be 
demonstrated by differences in financial indicators between Eurozone countries on one hand and European 
countries on the other hand that did not use the Euro: Bilateral bank holdings and transactions among Eurozone 
countries increased by roughly 40 percent following the adoption of the Euro. In contrast, bank holdings and 
transactions only increased by 25 to 30 percent if the three countries that did not adopt the Euro (the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden) are included within the Eurozone countries. Thus, the increase of transactions 
was significantly smaller in countries which did not adopt the Euro, underscoring the impact of the common 
currency [7].  
In this context we can summarize that both, financial deregulation and the fall in interest rates, contributed to 
large inflows of capital from core countries into periphery countries. Abundant credit from core countries 
triggered economic boom in periphery countries, driven largely by rising consumption. Yet, with rising wages 
and growth increasingly driven by unsustainably high domestic consumption, periphery countries lost export 
competitiveness and the manufacturing sector declined. At the same time, core countries’ competitiveness and 
their external surpluses improved, as a result of wage restraint and the relative undervaluation of the Euro 
compared to the earlier national currencies [7].  
The capital  flows into a country is measured by its current account deficit - a negative current account deficit 
means that the country is the recipient of international lending, while a surplus indicates that capital is being 
invested abroad. As we can see on figure 1, current account deficits of the periphery countries grew enormously 
in the years following Euro adoption in 1999, while the core countries became substantial sources of capital 
outflows [4]. 
The beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, despite the solid economic fundamentals in emerging 
market economies, for the lack of liquidity, made the international banks and investors to withdraw portfolio 
investments from these economies. The sudden stop which happened in 2009, made it difficult for this countries 
to roll over debt, and thus caused a crisis. Euro adoption made it impossible for the periphery countries to deal 
with sudden stop to capital flows. These countries could no longer issue sovereign debt in their own currency. 
Such circumstances made these countries vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment. Because of the common 
currency, periphery counties lacked the tools to manage their balance of payments [8]. Italy saw 160 billion 
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Euros exit in 2011, while Spain lost 100 billion Euros, in a mixture of bank withdrawals and sales of 
government and corporate bonds.  Foreign bank deposits have fallen 64% in Greece, 55% in Ireland and 37% in 
Portugal; in Italy, the fall is 34% and Spain 13%. Foreign government bond holdings have dropped 56% in 
Greece, 18% in Ireland and 25% in Portugal; in Italy the fall is 12% and Spain 18%. Figure 2 reports for each 
month the countries found to be in a sudden stop. 
Figure 1: Current Account Balance in the EZ countries (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: [4]. 
Table 1 presented budget balances and current account balances during the period after the adoption of the Euro 
and before the worldwide financial crisis, as % of GDP. 
Table 1: Fiscal and current account balances as % of GDP in the EZ countries (2000-07 average) 
Fiscal balance CA balance 
Country                                        2000-07ave Country                               2000-07ave 
Greece                                                  -5,4% Portugal                                            -9,4% 
Portugal                                                 -3,7% Greece                                             -8,4% 
Italy                                                       -2,9% Spain                                                -5,8% 
 France                                                   -2,7% Ireland                                             -1,8% 
 Germany                                               -2,2%             Italy                                                  -1,3% 
 Austria                                                  -1,6% France                                               0,4% 
  Netherlands                                         -0,6%         Austria                                               1,6% 
  Belgium                                               -0,4% Belgium                                             3,0% 
Spain                                                          0,3 Germany                                           3,2% 
  Ireland                                                     1,5 Netherlands                                       5,4% 
Luxemburg                                             2,3% Finland                                              5,9% 
Finland                                                       4,1 Luxemburg                                      10,6% 
 
Source: [4]. 
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Figure 2: Episodes of Sudden Stops 
 
Source: [8] 
With the beginning of crisis, especially with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, financial institutions from 
developed countries stricken by the crisis, started to massively withdraw the capital from their affiliates located 
in emerging market economies, which caused a negative influence over the foreign exchange reserves and 
national currencies and even over the liquidity crisis in these economies. Euro area asset and liability financial 
flows fell sharply, from 20% of GDP in 2007 to less than 5% of GDP in 2008. Banks also decreased their assets 
held abroad. As a results of the liquidity shortage in the global banking sector, Euro area banks went from being 
net borrowers to being net lenders in last quarter of 2008 and for most of 2009 [9]. According to analyses, 
global crisis started because debt in the Eurozone’s periphery became so large that investors feared that entire 
countries were at risk of default. Financial markets lost confidence in the creditworthiness of Greece and other 
periphery countries and interest rates on government bonds soared to levels that forced the governments of these 
countries to seek bailouts from international community, including the European Community and the IMF [7]. 
The increase of public debt which resulted from these bailouts was further compounded by the ballooning of 
government deficits resulting from the sharp fall in revenue as a result of the drop in output and the adoption of 
stimulus packages to counteract the impact of the crisis.  Figure 3 show the evolution of public debt burden 
following the crisis. 
3. Economic policy measures as prevention against future large capital inflows in the EZ periphery 
Some believe that the crisis was fundamentally caused by irresponsible behavior by governments and 
individuals in EZ periphery-government deficit and debt in these countries were so large that once the Great 
Recession hit, investors lost confidence in the ability of those countries to remain solvent. So, they tried to dump 
the bonds from those countries, triggering the crises. Many analysts came to a conclusion that the crisis itself 
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was caused by fiscal profligacy in periphery countries. According to these analyses, fiscal discipline will allow 
Euro zone to regain strength, without further need for fiscal stimulus. We have to take into consideration that 
fiscal contraction during recession will typically fail to meet deficit reduction, because the austerity makes the 
recession worse.   
Figure 3: Evolution of General Government Deficit (as percent of GDP) in some EZ countries (2000-2011) 
 
Source: [7]. 
But, as it is shown in Table 1, the relationship between budget deficit and crisis is weaker. The factor that crisis 
countries have in common is that, without exception, they ran the largest current account deficits in the EZ 
during the period 2000-2007. The relationship between budget deficits and crisis is much weaker; some of the 
crisis countries had significant average surpluses during the years leading up to the crisis, while some of the EZ 
countries with large fiscal deficits did not experience crisis. Some of the crisis countries with large fiscal deficits 
did not experience crisis. So capital flow bonanzas and sudden stops, pushed periphery countries toward crisis 
[6].  
Consequently many analysts and observers have put forward that the Euro crisis is a balance-of-payments crisis 
at least as much as a fiscal crisis [10]. Crisis in the Euro zone has not occurred only as a result of fiscal 
indiscipline of some member states, as it is usually believed, but has also been a result of external, systemic 
reasons, such as the large capital flows. 
If the crisis is due primarily to local causes, than the best predictor of crisis is government deficit and debt. If the 
primary reason are large capital inflows, than a better predictor of the crisis would be large current account 
deficit, which necessarily happens when there is a capital flow bonanza. 
If crisis is due to the irresponsible behavior of the periphery countries, than they must pay the price, because 
bailout of the periphery countries may encourage future irresponsible behavior. But if the crisis was mainly a 
result of forces outside the control of the EZ periphery countries, it is not appropriate to ask them for fiscal 
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restrictions. All of the members of the EZ have enjoyed the benefits of the common currency. The large capital 
flows from the EZ core to the periphery during the years 1999-2007 are evidence that investors in the core EZ 
counties enjoyed and took full advantage of the high returns they could get on new investment opportunities in 
the periphery. They have been able to enjoy significantly stronger exports for the past 10 years thanks to the 
Euro. Since all members benefit from the common currency, all will have to pay the price of dealing with its 
vulnerabilities.   
It doesn’t seem appropriate that the burden of solving the crisis should be placed on periphery countries, while 
the benefits of the common currency were shared by both the core and the periphery. In this context substantial 
assistance from the core to the periphery in response to the crisis can be viewed as the responsibility of the core 
EZ counties.  
Confronted whit a public debt crisis peripheral countries have been forced by the Euro zone to impose harsh 
austerity. Peripheral countries have been forced to accept IMF conditionality but whit out an IMF loan. Better 
policy alternatives are available, but they involve radical social and economic change. The first alternative 
available to peripheral countries is austerity accompanied with further liberalization. This means adopt austerity 
by cutting waged and reducing public borrowing requirements. This strategic alternative will achieve 
stabilization through recession, imposing huge costs on working people. It offers little prospect of sustained 
growth in the future. 
The second alternative is radical reform of the Euro zone. It would involve greater fiscal freedom by member 
states, enlarged European budget, fiscal transfers from rich to poor, support for wages, protection for 
employment etc.  
The third option is radical exit from Euro zone. The aim of this strategy is reintroduction of the national 
currencies and internal devaluation, which would revive export. But there would be losses for those servicing 
debt abroad, including banks, and workers would face wage declines. Devaluation requires a redistribution of 
spending, with the creditors spending more, while the debtors spend less. Second, it requires a real depreciation 
on the part of the debtors, a real appreciation on the part of the creditors, that is, wages and prices in the 
Eurozone’s periphery must fall relative to those in Euro zone core [6].  
If we suppose that Euro zone emerges from this crisis, and member countries still exclusively using the Euro. In 
this case there will once again be capital flows from the EZ core to the periphery. After few years investors will 
regain confidence and once more try to seek out the higher returns that are available in the periphery countries, 
and recipient countries will once again be vulnerable to a sudden stop. And they will once again lack policy 
tools to deal with it when it happens. In this context the question is: can anything be done to fundamentally 
make the Euro zone system more stable? What kind of measures of economic policy could act as prevention in a 
situation of reappearance of great capital inflows in the EZ periphery?  
One of the reasons that this crisis has gotten so bad is that the EZ periphery countries lacked any tools to deal 
with it, largely because in common currency area they have no central bank to fall beck on in the event of 
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liquidity crunch. This problem can be solved through number of steps, ex if ECB provide unlimited liquidity to 
any EZ country that need it.   
The current crisis has led to significant changes in patterns of cross-border financial flows and has led to 
increasing attention being paid to cross-border financial flows and recognition of their importance for 
macroeconomic and financial stability [9]. It is well known that, countries with a very high degree of financial 
openness are more exposed to periods of higher tension in the financial markets, leading to repatriation of 
foreign investment capital. External financial flows can be volatile and easy reversible.  
In this context it is necessary to emphasize that sudden stops may happen even when a country is following all 
the right macroeconomic policies. The Mexican and East Asian financial crises of the 1990s are good examples 
of that. In the case of the Eurozone, the sudden stop to capital flows in 2009 indiscriminately hit all of the 
periphery countries, regardless of how well they had managed their finances [4]. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, 
and Spain experienced significant private capital inflows from 2002 to 2007-9, followed by unambiguous and 
rather sudden outflows.  
Global financial crisis also provided some lessons in macroeconomic discipline. Despite the undeniably 
beneficial effects of financial integration on growth and on general societal welfare, imbalanced capital flows 
imply significant risk for economies whenever they are coupled with unsustainable domestic policies. Balanced 
and sustainable macroeconomic policies are helps to enable countries to attract stable and balanced capital 
inflows, which are conductive in long-run growth of the economy [9]. 
Capital controls would also have to be imposed on the capital account to prevent outflow of capital. (ex. each 
international transaction to be subject to a small transaction tax). This will make investors think more careful 
and move more slowly both into and out of international capital markets. A significant number of studies 
confirm that capital controls represent a useful instrument in different situations: for stabilization of volatile 
short-term capital flows, for increasing the independance of  monetary policy, for  changing  the composition of 
capital flows in favour of FDI, and for  reducing  the pressure on the  exchange rate [3].  
Since the introduction of single currency in 1999 European Monetary Union has played a key role in the process 
of financial integration in the global area. The global financial crisis (2007) interrupted the process of steady 
global integration. 
According to some economists, the global economy is at a crossroads. One path leads to regulatory integration 
on a global scale, creating national economies with extremely close ties. The second path leads to a world where 
national economies are more isolated and rely on domestic consumption for growth countries would becomes 
isolationist, continuing to retreat from international capital markets and concentrate on domestic growth [11].  
Global financial crisis actually presents crisis of globalization. Increased internationalization of capital flows, 
caused the effect of contagion, and raised the fears of possible reaction against financial globalization and 
integration.  
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3. Conclusion 
The root cause of the recent Eurozone crisis was unrestricted financial deregulation and liberalization. It is well 
known that in the world of high capital mobility, sudden stops of capital inflows may occur, typically triggering 
financial crises. The common currency promoted greater financial market integration between member 
countries, and pushed Eurozone peripheral countries to incur large amounts of international debt. Financial 
deregulation and the fall in interest rates encouraged large-scale capital flows from EZ core to periphery. Capital 
flows fueled a peripheral boom, and sharply rising wages and prices in the EZ periphery relative to EZ core.   
With the beginning of the global financial crisis, international banks and investors from the EZ core, started 
massively to withdraw capital from the periphery countries, which had negative impact on the foreign exchange 
reserves in these economies. The sudden stop, which happened in 2009, made it difficult for the periphery 
countries to roll over their debt, and thus caused a liquidity crisis.  These countries could no longer issue 
sovereign debt in their own currency. Such circumstances made these countries vulnerable to changes in 
investor sentiment. 
According to some economists, the crisis was fundamentally caused by irresponsible behavior of the 
governments in periphery countries. But, if the crisis is due primarily to local causes (i.e. by fiscal profligacy), 
than fiscal discipline will allow the Eurozone to regain its strength, without further need for fiscal stimulus. 
However, we have to underline that fiscal consolidation and restriction during the recession, would make the 
recession even worse.   
If the crisis is indeed the result of the irresponsible behavior of the periphery countries, than they have to be 
forced by the EU to impose harsh austerity, cutting wages and reducing public   spending. Another possible 
option is exit from the EZ, reintroduction of national currencies and internal devaluation. Internal devaluation 
would revive exports in those countries, but they would suffer losses from servicing foreign currency debts. All 
these options have their serious drawbacks. 
In this paper we argued that the EZ crisis has not occurred only as a result of fiscal indiscipline, but have also 
been a result of external, systemic reasons, such as the large capital flows. Euro-adoption not only set the stage 
for the crisis by encouraging a capital flow bonanza to the EZ periphery; it also made it impossible for the 
periphery countries to deal with the sudden stop to those capital flow. 
An interesting question in the context of capital flows to periphery countries is what will happen in few years if 
investors regain confidence and once more try to seek out the higher returns that are available in the periphery 
countries. That means that recipient countries will once again be vulnerable to a sudden stop. Periphery 
countries have to increase their attention on international capital inflows and to recognize their impact on 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Sound macroeconomic and financial policies would help peripheral 
countries to attract stable and balanced capital inflows, which are sustainable in the long-run. 
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